Rapidly growing developing economies have exported heavily and run current account surpluses. This paper explores whether learning-by-exporting helps explain this macroeconomic behavior of developing countries. It builds up a two-country general equilibrium growth model in which a developing economy bene…ts from learning-byexporting as it trades with a developed economy. In the benchmark model, the policies are restricted to non-trade related ones by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The optimal policy for the developing country is then to tax non-traded goods consumption and subsidize savings to increase exports. This policy generates the simultaneous fast growth and current account surpluses observed in the data. However, if there were no WTO restrictions, the developing country would manipulate its terms of trade rather than its current account. This policy improves the welfare of both developing and developed countries, highlighting that terms of trade manipulation can be a "win-win" in the presence of learning-by-exporting.
Introduction
Rapidly growing developing economies such as China and other Asian countries have exported heavily 1 and run current account surpluses. The fast growth accompanied by current account surpluses contradicts the prediction of the open-economy neoclassical growth model that countries with faster productivity growth should receive more net capital in ‡ows to fund investment and smooth consumption. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012) name this inconsistency the "allocation puzzle." These fast growing countries'current account surpluses contribute to the worldwide current account imbalances, or so-called "global imbalances." 2 Since these economies have exported heavily, a popular view is that export-led growth may be behind some of these dramatic growth phenomena. This is supported by empirical studies which suggest that "learning-by-exporting" (exporters' productivity improvement accompanied by increased exports) may be quantitatively large in developing countries. This paper takes the popular view seriously and explores whether learning-by-exporting helps explain the key macroeconomic behavior of fast-growing developing countries. This paper also examines which policies exploit learning-by-exporting, their implications for aggregates like the current account and the real exchange rate, the welfare consequences for the growing economy and the rest of the world, and whether restricting the set of policies to non-trade related policies matters.
In order to answer these questions, this paper builds up a two-country general equilibrium growth model in which a developing economy bene…ts from learning-by-exporting as it trades with a developed economy. This positive externality in the developing country's 1 Figure 1 shows that since 1991, China's export has grown persistently. The average export to GDP ratio in China from 1991 to 2007 is 25.22%. Over the same period, the average growth rate of China's real GDP per capita is 9.57%. 2 As shown in Figure 2 , China has run a current account surplus since the early 1990s, while the U.S.
has run a persistent current account de…cit. This current account imbalance between the U.S. and China contribute to global imbalances. export provides it with an incentive to increase exportation. The model is calibrated to match relevant data moments of the U.S. and China in 1991 and is simulated for transition to steady state. I consider a setup in which policies are restricted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to non-trade related policies as the benchmark. 3 In this benchmark model, the optimal policy for the developing country is to tax non-traded goods consumption and subsidize savings, which shifts labor into the tradable sector and suppresses consumption to increase exports. 4 These policies generate the simultaneous fast growth and current account surpluses observed in the data. These policies improve the welfare of the developing country relative to a competitive equilibrium without any policies because the developing economy bene…ts from rapid growth due to learning-by-exporting. However, the welfare change of the developed country between the benchmark case and the no policy economy is quantitatively negligible.
If there were no WTO restrictions, the developing country would have an incentive to manipulate its terms of trade rather than distort savings. Speci…cally, the developing country subsidizes exports to reduce its consumption of the export good and increase consumption of the import good. This policy generates a large deterioration in the developing economy's terms of trade, counter to the standard optimal tari¤ idea in which countries want to raise their terms of trade. The policy also reverses the prediction for its current account. In 3 Since the WTO is designed to liberalize international trade, it forces countries to decrease tari¤s and export subsidies. Therefore, the WTO prevents countries from manipulating their terms of trade. The WTO restrictions in this model represent the general state of trade rules that prevent countries from manipulating terms of trade. For instance, a country may not be able to manipulate its terms of trade if its trading partner can implement trade policies in retaliation. 4 This response is consistent with current Chinese government policies. The Chinese government is taxing the gross revenue in the service sector (Business Tax), but in the manufacturing sector, they are taxing the di¤erence between a commodity's price and its production cost (Value Added Tax). Ping, Liang, Hao, Zhang, and Mao (2009) show that if the tax rate of the Business Tax is converted to a Value Added Tax, it is 18.2%. This is greater than the Value Added Tax rate of 17% that is applied to manufacturing. Therefore, the Chinese government is taxing the service sector heavier than the manufacturing sector, thus the policy of applying a non-traded good's consumption tax is consistent with China's tax regime. The optimal policy of providing a savings subsidy is also consistent with China's policy of stockpiling a large amount of government savings, which was 4.4% of GDP in 1992 and 10.8% in 2007, according to Ma and Yi (2010) . particular, the developing economy now runs a current account de…cit, as it no longer relies heavily on the savings distortion to promote exports. This policy raises the welfare of both countries relative to the benchmark model, as it generates faster economic growth in the developing economy and improvement of the terms of trade in the developed economy.
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This highlights the fact that terms of trade manipulation can be a "win-win" in the presence of a positive externality in developing countries from learning-by-exporting, which contrasts with Bagwell and Staiger (1999) 's view that the WTO improves world welfare by preventing zero-sum terms of trade manipulation.
This paper also considers a "coordinated policy" problem to obtain the …rst-best outcome for the world. If both developing and developed countries coordinate policies to achieve the world's best allocation, both countries' welfare rises signi…cantly compared with the benchmark economy. In this setup, the developing country's terms of trade deteriorate even further, and it runs a greater current account de…cit relative to the "no-WTO restrictions"
case. This large deterioration of the developing country's terms of trade reduces welfare of the developing country and increases that of the developed country, compared with the "no-WTO restrictions" case. However, the welfare changes of both countries between the "coordinated policy" case and the "no-WTO restrictions" economy are quantitatively small.
This result implies that we can obtain almost the same results as the …rst-best outcome for the world by allowing developing countries to subsidize their exporters. This paper is motivated by two distinct lines of study. The …rst consists of empirical micro studies that …nd large estimates of learning-by-exporting in developing countries. 6 A possible explanation is that exporters in developing countries improve their productivity through imitation and technology spillover from developed countries. 7 The most challenging task of these studies is to control for the e¤ects of the unobserved di¤erences in …rm characteristics between exporters and non-exporters. In order to control for this selection bias, Van Biesebroeck (2005) Loecker (2013)) show that there is a jump in …rms'productivity accompanied by the initiation of exporting, which cannot be explained by learning-by-doing. One might also think that learning-by-importing is as important as learning-by-exporting. According to Keller (2004) , however, there has been little empirical support for learning-by-importing.
The second literature focuses on either global imbalances or the allocation puzzle and attempts to develop mechanisms to explain the observed data patterns. Suggested explanations regarding global imbalances include the lack of …nancial assets in developing countries (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008); Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) ) and weakened precautionary savings motive in the U.S. caused by the "great moderation" (Fogli and Perri (2006) ). Studies on the allocation puzzle provided consumption habits (Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) ), …nancial frictions faced by private …rms in China (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) ), limited commitment and political economy distortions (Aguiar and Amador (2011)) , and a ‡atter cross-sectional age-income pro…le accompanied by fast growth (Guo and Perri (2013) ; Song and Yang (2010) ) as potential explanations.
However, this literature focuses on net trade (typically in one-good models) and is silent on comparative advantage. My paper not only provides a new explanation regarding these puzzling data patterns but also analyzes the connection between growth, current account to advanced production technologies, technical assistance from foreign buyers, competition with foreign …rms and higher quality standards in international markets relative to domestic markets.
surplus, and WTO restrictions in the comparative advantage framework. Furthermore, it explores the optimal polices in the presence of learning-by-exporting and welfare consequences for developing and developed countries, both of which have not been addressed by previous studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model; section 3 describes the calibration of the model; section 4 discusses the results; section 5 explains a "coordinated policy" problem and its results; section 6 provides the welfare analysis; section 7 does a sensitivity analysis on the degree of learning-by-exporting; and section 8 concludes my …ndings.
Model
I present a two-country general equilibrium growth model. one non-traded commodity and both countries share two traded goods (z 2 f1; 2g). There is also an international …nancial market that buys and sells risk-free bonds b i t with a return denoted by 1 + r t . Each economy is populated by …rms that produce goods and workers 8 Using aggregate data, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012) show that the savings wedge is the key in explaining developing countries' fast growth accompanied by current account surpluses. Motivated by their result, this paper builds up the most parsimonious model for savings side. Rapidly growing developing countries, which run current accout surpluses, tend to undergo a lot of investment but save even more. The saving side is particularly puzzling given the fast growth. We have models of why there may be capital wedges (enforcement, for example), but few regarding savings wedges. Including capital in the model will a¤ect the quantitative results, but the key mechanism still stands that absent the ability to manipulate the terms of trade, learning-by-exporting calls for a savings wedge. who provide domestic …rms with labor. Lastly, the South country has a government that implements policies to take advantage of learning-by-exporting.
Firms
Country i 2 fN; Sg …rms in the trade goods sector use labor n i t (z) to produce output y i t (z) according to a constant returns to scale production function
where
Labor productivity in the trade goods sector depends on each country's human capital.
Since is greater than zero, the second traded commodity's production is more human capital intensive than the …rst traded commodity's. The South country has a comparative advantage in the …rst traded commodity's production because it has less human capital
Therefore, the South country exports the …rst traded commodity. Labor is hired by the …rms in a competitive domestic labor market that clears at an equilibrium wage w i t . Firms in the traded goods sector maximize their pro…t
Since I assume a perfect competition in the traded goods sector, the law of one price holds.
Thus, the world price of traded commodity z is
Since the South country produces the …rst traded commodity and the North produces the second traded commodity, the South's domestic wage is
A …rm in the non-traded goods sector uses labor n i t to produce output y i t according to a constant returns to scale production function
I assume that labor productivity in the non-traded goods sector is equal to one in both countries because the focus is on productivity improvement in the traded goods sector. 9 The non-traded goods sector …rm maximizes its pro…t
Therefore, each country's non-traded commodity price is
The North's non-traded commodity/ labor is the numeraire.
Domestic Workers
A representative worker supplies labor N i inelastically for domestic …rms in both non-traded and traded goods sectors, and can trade a risk-free bond b i t from the international …nancial market. The worker enjoys utility ‡ows from consumption of the non-traded commodity c i t and two traded goods c i t (z), z 2 f1; 2g : The worker discounts the future utility with a discount factor 2 (0; 1) and has preferences:
(1 ) ; 2 (0; 1) ; 2 (0; 1) :
9 Even if I allow the productivity in the non-traded commodity sector to di¤er across these two countries, all the qualitative results carry through. If the North labor productivity in non-traded goods sector is greater than that of the South, the North produces and consumes more non-traded goods than before, and all other allocations do not change.
Note that Cobb-Douglas preferences feature a unit elasticity of substitution across the nontraded commodity and two traded goods. With this form of utility function, the expenditure share on traded goods is . Within traded goods, the proportions of the …rst and second traded commodity are and 1 , respectively. The South country's real exchange rate is
; i 2 fN; Sg :
Since the law of one price holds in the traded goods sector, the South country's real exchange rate is de…ned by the ratio of each country's non-traded commodity price.
I assume that the North does not levy taxes, so the representative worker in the North country maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint:
However, the representative worker in the South country maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint:
The South government can tax or subsidize non-traded commodity consumption
, and/ or domestic savings ( r t ). In addition, the government can use a lump-sum tax or transfer (T t ).
10 Without loss of generality, I normalize taxes on imports to zero. . Then, I will compare the results of the benchmark model to those of a "nopolicy" competitive equilibrium 
Law of Motion for South Human Capital
I assume the North has exhausted learning-by-exporting, so only the South country grows through learning-by-exporting as it trades with the North country. Two common …ndings in empirical micro studies on learning-by-exporting are that an exporter's productivity improves as their value of exports grows, and this export-productivity relationship becomes stronger as …rms export to relatively more developed countries. On the basis of these evidences, I
model the degree of learning-by-exporting as an increasing function of both the South value of exports and the di¤erence in human capital stocks between North and South. Thus, the law of motion for South human capital is
"Learning-by-Exporting"
The South's human capital can grow up to H N , where 2 (0; 1) 12 ; through learning-byexporting. 13 The di¤erence between North and South human capital stocks is then repre- reaches 99% of H N . 14 Note that the South's learning-by-exporting depends on the di¤erence in human capital stocks between North and South. If the North human capital grows over time, the South's productivity gains from learning-exports. If there is productivity improvement from the second traded commodity exports, the South country exports both traded goods in the steady state. In order to exclude this extreme case, the degree of learning-by-exporting from the second traded commodity exports is set at zero. The parameter > 0 governs the degree of learning-by-exporting, which is a decreasing function of :
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists of a set of quantities c 1. given prices and taxes, workers maximize utilities 2. given prices, …rms maximize pro…ts 3. the South human capital evolves according to the law of motion stated in equation (1) 4. the South government budget constraint is satis…ed:
5. goods markets clear:
6. labor markets clear:
. bond market clears:
by-exporting are not exhausted. The South cannot converge to steady state. 15 Without loss of generality, I assume that the government runs a balanced budget using a lump-sum tax or transfer (T t ).
Ramsey Problem
The South government recognizes the law of motion for its human capital and implements policies in order to take advantage of learning-by-exporting. 16 The South government's problems in the benchmark model and the "no-WTO restrictions" case are the Ramsey problem of choosing a competitive equilibrium to maximize the South worker's utility, given
Following the primal approach to the Ramsey problem (Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997) ), I formulate the South government's problems as if the government chooses an allocation, subject to constraints, that ensure the existence of prices and taxes such that the selected allocation is consistent with the optimizing behavior of workers and …rms.
Benchmark
The allocation selected by the South government has to satisfy the law of motion for South human capital, both countries' domestic labor markets clearing conditions, and all goods markets clearing conditions. In addition to these standard constraints, the allocation should also satisfy: (i) the North worker's optimality conditions and present-value budget constraint, (ii) the optimality conditions of the North …rms, and (iii) WTO restrictions.
The North representative worker solves:
Therefore, the North worker's optimality conditions are:
16 Note that …rms do not internalize learning-by-exporting in this model. If …rms recognize learning-byexporting, the only thing …rms can do to take advantage of learning-by-exporting is dumping. However, …rms cannot use dumping because of the WTO restrictions. Therefore, a government's macroeconomic policy is essential to get the full bene…t from learning-by-exporting.
where u c N t (z) is the North worker's marginal utility of consumption for the traded commodity z 2 f1; 2g ; and u c N t is the North worker's marginal utility of consumption for its non-traded commodity.
Note that the North worker's optimality conditions and present-value budget constraint are summarized as the following implementability condition:
This implies that any competitive equilibrium must satisfy the North implementability condition, and any allocation that satis…es this condition and goods market clearing conditions can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.
The optimality conditions of the North …rms are summarized as follows:
The …rms in the North's traded goods sector do not produce the traded commodity z if its world price p t (z) is less than the …rms'unit labor cost
.
The WTO restrictions are represented by
Since the South government cannot directly subsidize exports or manipulate terms of trade in the benchmark model, the South's domestic relative price of the export good to import good pt (1) pt (2) is equal to the world price.
Therefore, the South government's problem in the benchmark model 18 is formulated as follows: the South government solves
17 See the appendix for the derivation of the implementability condition. 18 See the appendix for the computation algorithm used to solve the benchmark model. subject to
No WTO Restrictions
If there were no WTO restrictions, the allocation chosen by the South government has to satisfy all constraints of the benchmark model above except the last equation
. Therefore, the "no-WTO restrictions" problem drops the last constraint which implies the South government can manipulate terms of trade. Consequentially, the South's domestic relative price of the export good to import good pt(1) pt (2) can be di¤erent from the world price.
Calibration
This section explains how I set parameter values of the benchmark model economy. I interpret the North country as the U.S. and the South country as China. A set of parameters are adopted from related literature and the U.S. data. The model period is one year. The discount factor is set at 0:96; which implies 4% real interest rate per annum at the steady state, and the preference parameter ; which determines the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is set at 2: The expenditure share on traded goods is 0:2438; which is the average China. 27 I use the same speci…cation for the "no-policy" and "no-WTO restrictions" cases.
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1 .
Results
This section explains the quantitative results and is organized as follows: Subsection 4.1 explains the results of the benchmark model and compares them to the observed data patterns; Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 present the results of the "no-policy" economy and the "no-WTO restrictions" case in comparison with those of the benchmark, respectively.
Benchmark
The period 0 corresponds to the year 1991. When the South government cannot use an export subsidy EX t = 0 due to WTO restrictions, the optimal policy for the South country is to tax the non-traded good's consumption and subsidize savings as shown in Figure 3 .
This shifts labor into the tradable sector and suppresses the South's overall consumption to increase its exports. Figure 4 shows that the South government initially shifts labor into the tradable sector by suppressing consumption of the non-traded commodity. As the South's human capital grows through learning-by-exporting, it gradually raises its labor allocation to the non-traded commodity sector and therefore its consumption. 10% increase in exports, its productivity rises by 11% to 13% in China. 28 As I describe in Subsections 4.2, 4.3 and 5.2, the South produces the second traded commodity during the latter part of the transition in the "No Policy", "No-WTO Restrictions", and "Coordinated Policy"
cases. This is because initially the South runs a substantial current account de…cit. In order to repay the The initial pattern of exports and imports of the South causes the country to run a current account surplus, accompanied by rapid growth in its real GDP as shown in Figure 6 . 29 This result shows that the gains from distorting savings to encourage exports are even larger than the incentive to smooth consumption. During the transitional phase, the South's terms of trade stay constant. Note that when one country produces both traded goods, the terms of trade are determined by its productivity ratio between the two traded goods' production.
Since the North produces both traded goods for all periods, the South's terms of trade are equal to the North's productivity ratio between two traded goods
. This is equal to the U.S. relative labor productivity of exporters in 1992 (1:169). The constant South's terms of trade makes the South's real exchange rate appreciate as its human capital grows. This is because the South's real exchange rate is a function of its terms of trade and relative productivity in the traded commodity's production e S t n pt(1) pt(2)
Simultaneous growth and real exchange rate appreciation is consistent with the Balassa Table 2 , the South's policies generate the simultaneous fast growth and current account surpluses observed in the data. 31 In addition, the benchmark model replicates both China's interest on its debt, the South shifts more workers from non-tradable sector to both tradable sectors so that it runs a trade surplus for the rest of the transition periods. 29 As can be seen in Figure 2 , China's current account surplus has increased over time. However, in this model, the South's current account surplus is decreasing over time. The Chinese government could have gradually implemented policies to take advantage of learning-by-exporting. However, since this is a perfect foresight model, the South does not gradually implement policies. In order to match the trend, I should introduce some frictions like adjustment costs into this model. 30 Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) argue that economic growth driven by productivity gains in the traded goods sector should accompany a real exchange rate appreciation. 31 This model overstates China's current account surplus and understates the U.S. current account de…cit.
However, what is important is that the model can qualitatively replicate the sign of current accounts of both countries. In reality, both countries have other trading partners than each other. The discrepancy between current account generated by the model and its data counterpart may come from each country's trade with export over GDP and the appreciation of its real exchange rate as in the data.
No Policy Counterfactual
In the "no-policy" economy, both …rms and workers know that the South's human capital will grow over time but no one recognizes its law of motion. Therefore, the South government has no incentive to raise the South's exports in order to take advantage of learning-by-exporting.
If no policies were implemented in both the North and South countries, the transition to the steady state takes 118 periods as shown in Figure 7 . This is 6 periods longer than that of the benchmark economy because no one implements policies to accelerate the South's growth through learning-by-exporting in the "no-policy" economy. During the transition, the patterns of specialization in production undergo three stages: (i) the North produces both traded goods and the South produces the …rst traded commodity for the …rst 96 periods; (ii) both countries are completely specialized in period 97; and (iii) the South starts to produce the second traded commodity, in addition to the …rst traded commodity, in period 98. Figure 7 shows that more South workers produce in the non-traded commodity sector for the initial 85 periods relative to the benchmark case, because the South's labor productivity in the …rst traded commodity's production is much less than that in the non-traded commodity's production over the same periods. This initially suppresses the South's …rst traded commodity's exports although its consumption for the …rst traded commodity is less than in the benchmark economy as shown in Figure 8 , delaying the take-o¤ of its human capital relative to the benchmark case.
Since the South workers know that their income will grow in the future, they want to raise current consumption. The South consumes more non-traded goods in the …rst 85 periods than in the benchmark economy, leading to a larger aggregate consumption. This makes the South's current account de…cit 32 increase for the same periods. The South workers move from the non-tradable sector to both tradable sectors for the rest of the transition periods the rest of the world. 32 The size of the current account de…cits is implausible. This is caused by the full commitment and perfect foresight assumptions.
so that the South runs a trade surplus in order to repay the interest on its debt. 33 Since more workers produce in both traded commodity sectors in the South country relative to the benchmark economy beginning in period 86, the level of South real GDP becomes greater than that in the benchmark case as Figure 9 presents. This is because labor productivity in the traded goods production is higher than that in non-traded commodity production over the same period. Figure 9 shows that the South terms of trade start to deteriorate in period 97 when both countries are completely specialized. 34 Beginning in period 98 when the South produces both traded goods, its terms of trade, which are equal to the South
; improve as its human capital grows. For the same period, the real exchange rate appreciates following the South's human capital growth.
No WTO Restrictions
If there were no WTO restrictions EX t 6 = 0 , the South country can directly subsidize exports. Figure 10 shows that the transition to the steady state takes 71 periods but most of the catch-up takes place in the …rst 50 periods. During transition, the North produces both traded goods and the South produces the …rst traded commodity for the …rst 26 periods. As the South's human capital grows, it gradually expands the world market share of the …rst traded commodity. In period 27, the South completely takes over the market for the …rst traded commodity, which leads to complete specialization of both countries until period 35.
The South starts to produce the second traded commodity in period 36.
As shown in the left panel of Figure 11 , the South government suppresses consumption of the export good (Traded Commodity 1) to a larger degree during the transition relative to benchmark outcomes. This raises the South's exports, making its human capital grow at an even faster rate through learning-by-exporting relative to the benchmark economy. Figure 10 shows that, compared to the benchmark, the South government shifts more workers from the non-traded commodity sector to both traded goods sectors. Since labor productivity in both 33 The right panel of Figure 8 shows that the South exports even the second traded commodity from period 100 despite a comparative disadvantage. 34 The South terms of trade in the benchmark model is normalized to 1 in Figures 9, 12 , and 16.
traded goods' production is higher than that in the non-traded commodity's production, the level of South real GDP in "no-WTO restrictions" case is greater than that in the benchmark economy beginning in period 11. The right panel of Figure 11 shows that the South substitutes the alternative imports by raising consumption of the import good (Traded Commodity 2) substantially for the initial periods. As the South accumulates human capital through learning-by-exporting, its imports decline to a level which is even below that in the benchmark after period 36-when the South starts to produce the second traded commodity.
The South's increased imports initially cause the country to run a large current account de…cit. As the South's imports decline, the current account de…cit also goes down and ultimately becomes balanced in the steady state. The South government's export subsidy generates a deterioration in its terms of trade pt (1) pt (2) beginning in period 27 when both countries start to be completely specialized, as shown in the lower panel of Figure Figure 13 shows that if there were no WTO restrictions, the South country will use an export subsidy for the initial 35 periods instead of a non-traded commodity consumption tax, and it no longer relies heavily on the savings subsidy to promote exports. The switch of sign in the current account from the benchmark to the "no-WTO restrictions" case implies that, ideally, the South would like to manipulate its terms of trade rather than its current account.
However, if the ability to explicitly subsidize exports is absent due to WTO restrictions, it must "over" distort both the intertemporal margin and the non-traded margin.
Coordinated Policy Problem
In this section, I consider a "coordinated policy" problem in which the North and South could coordinate policies in order to obtain the …rst-best outcome for the world. I assume that there is a …ctitious world planner who maximizes the weighted average of both the North and South utilities by taking advantage of the South country's learning-by-exporting.
The world planner solves
subject to
where 2 [0; 1] is the South country's Pareto weight.
If the South country exports the traded commodity z 2 f1; 2g, the world utility maximizing behavior of the planner implies the following …rst-order conditions:
where t is a multiplier for the law of motion for South human capital, u c i t (z) is the country i's marginal utility of consumption for the traded commodity z; and u c i t is the country i's marginal utility of consumption for its non-traded commodity. Note that the second term in the left side of the condition (2), shows that there is no distortion between the South's consumption for the export good and that of non-traded good. If a worker shifts from the non-traded commodity sector to the traded commodity z sector in the South country, this reduces one unit of the non-traded commodity. Thus, the welfare loss is the marginal utility of consumption for the non-traded commodity. However, the worker produces A S t (z) units of the traded commodity z. By consuming these units, the worker can enjoy their marginal utility of consumption for the commodity times their marginal product A S t (z) . Since the South country does not export the traded commodity z but consumes it, there is no additional welfare gain from learning-byexporting. 35 The conditions (2) and (3) imply that the planner decreases not only the South country's consumption for the export good but also that for non-traded good. This means that the planner raises the South's exports by reducing its consumption of domestically produced goods and increasing consumption of the import good.
Decentralization
In this subsection, I explain the way I …nd prices and wedges, which imply the …rst-best allocation for the world. The North country's non-traded commodity price is normalized to one. Since the North's relative consumption across goods is undistorted, I use their marginal rate of substitution between non-traded and each respective traded good as world prices.
That is, the world price p t (z) of traded commodity z is de…ned by
Since the South country has a comparative advantage in the …rst traded commodity's production, it produces the …rst traded commodity and the North produces the second traded commodity. Therefore, the South's domestic wage is de…ned by
A wedge 
Results
I use the same parameters for the "coordinated policy" case as in the benchmark economy, except for the South Pareto weight, = 0:3283; which is chosen so that the model matches the balanced steady state current account.
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When both the North and South coordinate policies to achieve the world best allocation, the transition to the steady state takes 64 periods as Figure 14 presents. This is 7 periods less than that of "no-WTO restrictions" economy because the world planner facilitates growth through terms of trade distortion even more. During the transition, the patterns of specialization in production undergo three stages, as before: (i) the North produces both traded goods and the South produces the …rst traded commodity for the …rst 25 periods; (ii) 36 If is greater than 0:3283, the South runs a current account de…cit at the steady state. If is less than 0:3283, it runs a current account surplus at the steady state. both countries are completely specialized from period 26 to 35; and (iii) the South starts to produce the second traded commodity in period 36. The …rst stage gets shorter relative to the "no-WTO restrictions" case.
The left panel of Figure 15 shows that the world planner reduces the South's consumption of the export good (Traded Commodity 1) even more from period 16 than in the "no-WTO restrictions" economy. This increases the South's exports, making its human capital grow more rapidly through learning-by-exporting than in the "no-WTO restrictions" case. As can be seen in Figure 14 , the world planner moves more workers from the non-traded commodity sector to both traded commodity sectors in the South country relative to the "no-WTO restrictions" economy beginning in period 16. This makes the level of South real GDP greater than that in the "no-WTO restrictions" case over the same period because labor productivity in the traded goods production is higher than that in the non-traded commodity's production.
The right panel of Figure 15 shows that, for initial periods, the world planner raises the South's imports by 42% of its GDP relative to the "no-WTO restrictions" world by increasing its consumption of the import good (Traded Commodity 2). This di¤erence in the South's imports between "coordinated policy" and "no-WTO restrictions" economies initially leads to a larger current account de…cit (42% of the South GDP) relative to the "no-WTO restrictions" case. Figure 16 shows that beginning in period 26, when both countries start to be completely specialized, the increase of the South's exports deteriorate its terms of trade pt (1) pt (2) much more than in the "no-WTO restrictions" economy. This large deterioration of the South's terms of trade causes its real exchange rate to be undervalued from period 26 to 35, as shown in Figure 16 . Over the same period, the South country's real GDP grows rapidly due to the fast growth of its human capital, which implies a rapid productivity improvement in traded goods sector. Growth accompanied with real exchange rate undervaluation contrasts with the prediction of the Balassa Figure 17 shows that the world planner uses a bigger export subsidy and a less saving subsidy relative to the "no-WTO restrictions" case. This implies that the world planner calls for more terms of trade manipulation than suggested by No-WTO policies.
Welfare Analysis
This paper explores optimal policies in the presence of learning-by-exporting in various environments: with WTO restrictions, with no restrictions, and under policy coordination.
An interesting question to ask is what implications these policies have for developing and developed countries'welfare. In order to answer this question, I measure the welfare changes resulting from moving from the benchmark economy with WTO restrictions to an alternative case. This is accomplished by …nding the percentage change in per-period consumption that I should give to a worker in each country in the benchmark such that the worker is indi¤erent between the two environments.
In the "no-policy" economy, the South country is not aware of the positive externality from learning-by-exporting, thus no policy is implemented to facilitate export-led growth.
On the other hand, in the benchmark model, the South government recognizes learning-byexporting and has an incentive to implement policies to increase exports. Since it cannot directly subsidize exports due to WTO restrictions, it alternatively taxes the non-traded good's consumption and subsidizes savings. This policy enables the South country to grow faster, bene…tting its workers, than in the "no-policy" world. Conversely, moving from the "no-policy" world to the benchmark economy slightly decreases the welfare of the North country. As can be seen in Table 3 , moving from the benchmark to a "no-policy" economy results in welfare changes equivalent to a 19:12% decline and 0:06% increase in per-period consumption of the South and the North, respectively.
If the South country is allowed to manipulate its terms of trade ("no-WTO restrictions" case), both the North and South bene…t from welfare improvement relative to the benchmark economy. Without restrictions on policies, the South country subsidizes exports to both reduce its consumption of the export good and increase consumption of the import good.
This policy generates a large deterioration in the South's terms of trade and a current account de…cit. This policy makes the South grow faster without raising savings heavily to promote exports, which improves the welfare of the South relative to the benchmark economy. In the "no-WTO restrictions" world, the North's welfare also increases due to improved terms of trade compared with the benchmark economy. This "win-win" outcome through terms of trade manipulation is re ‡ected in the positive welfare gains of 14:05% and 0:45% in perperiod consumption of the South and North, respectively. 37 This is contrary to Bagwell and Staiger (1999) 's view that the WTO improves world welfare by preventing zero-sum terms of trade manipulation.
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As shown in Table 3 , if both countries coordinate policies to achieve the …rst-best allocation, both countries'welfare rises signi…cantly compared with the benchmark economy. The …ctitious world planner manipulates the terms of trade of both countries so that the South grows faster through learning-by-exporting. This leads to increased welfare gains equivalent to 13:16% and 1:22% in per-period consumption of the South and North, respectively. However, moving from the "no-WTO restrictions" economy to the "coordinated policy" world, the North is better o¤ whereas the South is worse o¤. The world planner pulls down the relative price of the South's export good to its import good even further than the "no-WTO restrictions" economy. Even though this makes the South country grow faster, the larger deterioration of the South's terms of trade hurts its welfare. On the other hand, the North bene…ts from its improved terms of trade. However, the welfare changes of both countries 37 Although the South country is a small open economy that cannot a¤ect world prices, the South government can manipulate its internal terms of trade (the relative price of its exporting goods to importing goods in the South domestic markets) and grow rapidly through learning-by-exporting. However, the North's welfare does not increase because its terms of trade are not changed by the South's economic policies. 38 There may be other reasons that WTO restrictions improve the welfare of developing countries. For instance, Bajona and Chu (2010) claim that WTO restrictions increase China's welfare by reducing subsidies to the ine¢ cient state-owned sector.
moving from the "no-WTO restrictions" case to the "coordinated policy" economy are quantitatively modest, resulting in a 0:79% decrease for the South and 0:78% increase for the North.
Sensitivity Analysis
Recall that I calibrate my model such that the South and North emulate China and U.S., respectively. I end the paper by seeing how sensitive responses of China (South) and U.S.
(North) are to the degree of learning-by-exporting. The degree of learning-by-exporting is measured by a rise in a …rm's productivity accompanied by a 10% increase in exports.
According to Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010) , a …rm's productivity increases by 11% to 13% in China if it experiences an exogenous 10% rise in exports. Table 4 shows that if I use 8:82% on the degree of learning-by-exporting, the benchmark model still generates the simultaneous growth and current account surplus in China. However, the levels of both the average growth rate of China's relative real GDP per capita and its current account over GDP decrease relative to the benchmark calibration. If the degree of learning-by-exporting is one tenth of the highest value of the micro estimate, that is 1:30%, the South does not need to run a current account surplus to take advantage of learning-by-exporting. This result shows that the cross-country di¤erences in the degree of learning-by-exporting may explain the heterogeneity in the pattern of current accounts across developing countries.
Conclusion
This paper examines whether learning-by-exporting rationalizes key macroeconomic behavior of fast-growing developing countries. I also explore which policies exploit learning-byexporting, their implications for aggregates such as the current account and the real exchange rate, the welfare consequences for developing and developed economies, and whether restricting the set of policies to non-trade related policies matters.
In order to answer these questions, this paper builds a two-country general equilibrium growth model in which a developing economy bene…ts from learning-by-exporting as it trades with a developed economy. If policies are restricted by the WTO to non-trade related policies, the optimal policy for the developing country is to tax their non-traded good's consumption and subsidize savings, which rationalizes the observed current account surpluses of rapidly growing developing economies. This policy improves the welfare of developing country relative to a "no-policy" competitive equilibrium.
If there were no WTO restrictions, the developing country optimizes by directly subsidizing exports, generating a large deterioration in their terms of trade and reversing the response of their current account from surplus to de…cit. Optimizing in this fashion raises the welfare of both countries relative to the model with WTO restrictions, as it generates faster economic growth in the developing economy and improvement of the terms of trade in the developed economy. I also consider a "coordinated policy" problem to obtain the …rst-best outcome for the world. In this setup, the developing country's terms of trade deteriorate even further and it runs a greater current account de…cit relative to the "no-WTO restrictions"case.
The model not only provides a new explanation regarding "global imbalances" but also allows me to investigate the connection between growth, current account surplus and WTO restrictions. Lastly, unlike previous studies, I also explore optimal policies in the presence of learning-by-exporting, and welfare implications for countries under di¤erent regimes.
A Derivation of the Implementability Condition
The North representative worker solves: 
B Computation Algorithm
The following algorithm is used to solve the benchmark model.
1. Guess the Lagrangian multiplier of the implementability condition (6).
Given and b
N 0 = 0, solve the following value function using value function iterations and obtain the optimal decision rules: 
